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Presentamos estimaciones de ecuaciones de servicios médicos usando el European
Community Household Panel para doce países en el periodo 1994-1996. Nos centramos
en dos puntos específicos:  i) La identificación de similitudes y diferencias en la
demanda de salud entre países; ii) la variabilidad que es capaz de capturar un modelo
conjunto. Aunque hay diferencias significativas entre países, encontramos similitudes
en el efecto del fondo de salud, la situación laboral o la estructura familiar. Una fracción
importante de la variabilidad de la demanda de servicios de salud entre países se
explica por la diferencia en edad, ingreso y el papel del médico de familia como filtro
del sistema. También encontramos evidencia de demanda inducida en la decisión de
visitar y el número de visitas al especialista.
Palabras clave: datos recuento; demanda; servicios médicos; modelo clase latente;
modelo en dos partes.
ABSTRACT
This paper presents parameter estimates for physician services equations using the
European Community Household Panel for 12 countries covering the period 1994-1996.
The focus is on two specific points: i) the identification of behavioural similarities and
differences in the demand for health across the countries; ii) the variability of the
demand for health captured through a joint model for all the countries. We find that
there are significant differences across countries, although there are also similarities in
the effect of variables such as the health stock, labour situation or family structure. An
important fraction of the variability of the demand of health services across countries
could be explained from differences in age, income, and the role of General
Practitioners (GP) as a gatekeepers in the public health system. We also find some
evidence of induced demand effects in both the decision to visit and the number of
visits to specialists. 
Key words: count data; demand; physician services; latent class model; two-part
model
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper estimates demand for physician services equations for the twelve European Union (EU) 
countries listed in Table 1 (France, Finland and Sweden are excluded from the analysis because of the 
lack of adequate and/or sufficient data). The novelty of this exercise is that it uses a homogeneous and 
comparable data set to estimate a common model of demand for utilization services for this group of 
European countries. The main aim is to identify behavioural similarities and differences across the 
countries in the sample. In particular we want to assess how much of the variability of the demand for 
health can be captured through a joint model which accounts for differences in the health systems 
across these twelve countries. The implementation of any reform of the public health system in the EU 
requires a clear knowledge of the characteristics that determine this demand across the countries. We 
try to shed additional light on the scarce empirical evidence on this issue across Europe. Exceptions are 
Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), who estimate demand for health equations for Germany, Santos-Silva and 
Windmeijer (1997) for the UK, Alvarez (2001) for Spain, and Vera-Hernández (1999) for Catalonia. 
These papers use different data sets and different model specifications, which makes the results difficult 
to compare. 
We use a sample of males and females drawn from the 1994-1996 waves of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). Although the ECHP focuses on household income and living 
conditions across 15 EU countries it also collects the necessary information to estimate demand for 
health equations. In particular it collects information about the general health situation of the 
individuals and more importantly, it records the individuals’ number of visits to a general practitioner 
(GP) and to a specialist (SP) during the previous year. We use these two measures as indicators of the 
demand for physician services. 
Following the results in Jiménez-Martín et al. (2002)
1, the number of visits to a SP is specified  
as a two-part model (TPM). The TPM implies two stages in the determination of the demand for SP’s 
services. In a first stage the individual decides whether or not to visit a physician; in the second stage 
the duration of the treatment is decided partially or entirely by the physician (see Cromwell and 
Michell, 1986, Kenkel, 1990, Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995, or  Kenkel and Terza, 1999).  In contrast, the 
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number of visits to a GP is specified as a latent class model (LCM). The LCM implies one single stage 
in the determination of the demand for GP’s services, but it allows for unobservable heterogeneity 
among individuals, dividing the population among frequent and infrequent users. The distribution 
function of the unobservable characteristics is approximated by a finite mixture distribution function 
with two points of support (see Deb and Trivedi, 1997, 2002, or Deb and Holmes, 2000). The 
estimation is carried out separately for males and females, and both by country (heterogeneous model) 
and pooling the whole set of countries in the sample (homogeneous model). The results from the 
econometric specifications are then compared and the performance of the models tested.  
Our results show that, although there are significant behavioural differences across the countries 
in the sample, an important fraction of this variability (between one third and one half) can be explained 
by differences in income, age, and the role of GPs on the public health system. We also find important 
regularities across countries with respect to the effects of the individual health stock, the income, and 
the family structure variables on the demand for health. We also find that in countries were the GP acts 
as gatekeeper of the system the frequency of the visits to the GP increases while the contact probability 
to the SP and the of the visits to it decrease. Thus, GPs perform efficiently as gatekeepers.  Finally, we 
find evidence of induced demand since doctors that are paid fee-for-service tend to lengthen the   
duration of the treatment. 
  The rest of the paper contains four sections. In Section 2 we describe the data and the variables 
used. The model specification tests and the empirical results are reported in Section 3. Section 4 
contains the conclusions. 
2. DATA AND VARIABLES. 
The data that we use is a sample of males and females drawn from waves 1 to 3 of the ECHP (see 
Peracchi, 2002, for a description of the features of the ECHP). This panel survey, which has been 
carried out since 1994, contains valid information, for the purposes of this paper, on 12 European 
countries. Given the reduced time span of the panel we pool the three waves and use the longitudinal 
nature of the data only to construct some explanatory variables as explained below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
1 This article is exclusively devoted to the discussion of methodological questions, whose results are used in here. 
E2003/453
4
The ECHP focuses on household income and living conditions across 15 EU countries but it 
still provides interesting information on individual health and related issues. Apart from the 
traditionally asked questions on health status, such as a self-statement on global health or whether the 
person is hampered in daily activities, the survey includes some additional ones. More specifically, it 
records whether the individual has any chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or disability. 
Finally, the survey collects information on how many times an individual has consulted a doctor, a 
dentist or an optician during the past 12 months (visits to a doctor, optician or dentist are aggregated for 
the first wave).  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
We define the demand for health as the quantity of health services purchased and measure it as 
the number of visits to a GP and the number of visits to a SP during the previous 12 months. Figure 1 
shows the histogram of visits to the GPs (first row), specialists (second row) by sex (male on the left) 
and country. Notorious differences are detected by country, sex and kind of physician. Several reasons 
can be behind these figures. First of all, women visit doctors more often than men. Second, in all 
countries individuals visit a GP more often than a SP. Third, there seems to be a strong relationship 
between visits to the GP and per capita income, since individuals do visit the GP substantially less 
frequently  in Southern countries and Ireland. Fourth, the differences  across countries in the number of 
visits to SP may respond to the different rules governing the accessibility to a SP. In some countries a 
visit to a GP is a necessary step to arrange a visit to a SP (the GP acts as gatekeeper of the system) 
while in others the patient can directly visit a SP (see Table 1). According to the figures in the 
histograms all the countries in which  GPs act as gatekeepers show higher number of visits to GPs. 
Finally, the differences by sex are more evident in the case of visits to specialists than in visits to GPs. 
[insert figure 1 about here] 
In our analysis we consider three groups of  explanatory variables (see the Data Appendix for 
sources and definitions). The first group is formed by variables that affect the individual’s health 
perception. It includes age and its square, and income and its square. It also includes variables which 
reflect the individuals’ health endowments or stocks: a dummy for self-perceived good health, a dummy 
for suffering a chronic condition, a dummy for individuals that were accepted as in-patients at a 
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces4
hospital, and dummy for individuals hampered in their daily activities (see Anderson and Burkhauser, 
1985, for details on measures of health variables). Finally, this group of variables also include measures 
of the time opportunity cost, that is, variables relating job status (dummies for employment, self-
employment, unemployment, and retirement; dummies for part-time jobs) and variables relating the 
family structure of the individual (marital status, household size, and dummy for heads of the 
household).
The second group is composed of variables that affect the probability of having a health shock 
and the knowledge of this probability: education (dummy for high education), occupation (dummies for 
professional workers, for clerical workers, for service workers; dummy for doing any type of 
supervisory job; and, for working in the public sector), and a self-evaluation of on-the-job risk (dummy 
that equals one if the individual perceive his job as risky).  
Finally, the third group of variables is formed by country specific variables that try to 
approximate the differences between the health systems (see Table 1). This group includes two 
dummies reflecting the more common type of remuneration for doctors in every country: capitation (i.e. 
doctors are paid a fee for each patient registered with them), and salary (i.e. doctors are employed by 
the state or the insurer); the omitted dummy is fee-for-service (i.e. doctors are paid on the basis of the 
services provided). Also in this group are the number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants for the 
countries paying their doctors mainly with a fee-for-service scheme, the total health expenditure in each 
country, the contribution of public expenditure to total health expenditure, and a dummy which equals 
one for countries were GPs act as gatekeepers. 
In our empirical application, all the job, income, and health (except the indicator of chronic 
health condition) are lagged one period, since they may be endogenous to the demand for health 
decision.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
3.1. Theoretical framework 
In the literature on demand of health, medical care is used as an input in the household production 
function of health. The demand for medical services is therefore a derived demand, since services are 
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not consumed per se but to maintain or improve upon a certain health status. Following the traditional 
consumer theory approach, in each period the consumer (the patient) decides whether to visit a 
physician after comparing the marginal benefits and marginal costs of improving her health (Grossman, 
1972). The empirical counterpart of the demand for health equations derived from the previous model 
can be estimated using standard count data procedures. However, the estimation of these types of 
equations has usually provided results counter to the theoretical predictions (see Grossman, 1972, 
Cameron and Trivedi, 1986 or Wagstaff , 1986).  
One possible explanation for the results of the simple count models above is that the process 
that drives the demand for health is more complicated. It involves two agents, the patient and the 
physician, with asymmetric information about the illness. If this is the case, the demand for health can 
be modelled in the context of a principal-agent framework in which the agent (physician) could induce 
demand for his services once the initial contact is made (Zweifel, 1981, Kenkel, 1990, Grytten and 
Sørensen, 2001). The demand for health can be  decomposed in two stages. The first stage corresponds 
to the decision of contacting a physician and it is solely determined by the consumer. The second stage 
corresponds to the duration of the medical treatment (in terms of number of visits) and it is determined 
by both the patient and, more importantly, the physician. The principal-agent model can be 
econometrically specified as a hurdle or two-part model. This specification distinguishes between users 
and non-users of the physicians’ services. Additionally it assumes that the visits that the individual 
makes to a physician correspond to a single spell of illness during the period covered by the survey. 
This hypothesis has proven to be important for a good performance of the TPM (see Santos-Silva and 
Windmeijer, 2001, or Jimenez-Martín et al, 2002).
An alternative explanation for the failure of the simple count models is that they do not allow 
for enough heterogeneity among the individuals. One way to deal with the differences among 
individuals is to distinguish between users with a high average demand for health services and users 
with a low average demand for health services instead of users and non-users (see Deb and Trivedi, 
1997, 2002). The intuition behind is that individuals belong to different classes and that there is an 
associated probability of belonging to a particular class. In principle the number of types as well as the 
associated probabilities are estimated jointly with the rest of the parameters of interest. This treatment 
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of heterogeneity replaces the sharp distinction between users and non-users imposed in the TPM for a 
lenient one between different types of patients (e.g. individuals with high, medium and low average 
demand of physicians services). The latent class models that we propose below are a valid econometric 
specification for such a distinction. In addition they seem to perform better when the single spell of 
illness hypothesis does not hold.  
Following the results of Jimenez-Martín et al (2002) we propose a LCM for the demand for 
GP’s services and a TPM for the demand for SP’s services.
2 The results of these authors suggest that 
the TPM has a better performance than the LCM in modelling the demand for SP’s services probably 
due to the fact that the annual visits to the SP are more likely to correspond to a single spell of illness. 
Nevertheless, the LCM seems to perform better than TPM in modelling the demand for GP’s services. 
3.2. Econometric framework 
In this section we describe the two econometric specifications that we estimate, namely the 
TPM and the LCM.  Lets consider first the TPM. The demand for health can be specified as follows: 
) ( ilk ilk ilk ilk ilk Z f Y I 1 1 , ) 0 ε = > =1(        ( 1 )  
) ( ilk ilk ilk ilk X f Y 2 2 ,ε = ,         ( 2 )  
where Yilk is the number of visits to physician l (l = GP and SP) of individual i, belonging to country k.
) 0 > = ilk ilk Y I 1(  is a binary index, with 1(A) being an indicator of the occurrence of event A; X and Z
are exogenous sets of variables not necessarily disjoint. Finally ε1 and ε2 are error terms independently 
distributed
3. Note that Yilk only takes non-negative integers as values. Equation 1 describes the initial 
contact decision while Equation 2 describes the number of visits to the doctor. 
We are interested in explaining the conditional expectation of Yilk given the covariates. In the 
TPM this expectation can be decomposed in two terms, the probability of observing a positive outcome 
                                                          
2The models mentioned above can certainly describe the visits to some types of physicians. However 
more complex models could better describe the demand of health for other types of physicians. For example, in 
several countries the GPs act as gatekeepers of the medical system (see Table 1). That means that a visit to the GP
is a compulsory step for visiting a SP. In this case, an alternative decision process with three stages could be 
proposed. The first stage which relates the initial contact with a GP remains unaltered. At a second stage, the GP
decides upon a possible visit to a SP, and at a third stage the SP  and the patient decide the duration of the 
treatment. However, the data that we use (ECHP) lacks enough information to model this complex process.  
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(part one or first hurdle) times the conditional expectation of Yiljk given that it is positive
4  (part two or 
second hurdle). The first component can be estimated assuming a discrete choice model (Probit or 
Logit) or through a Poisson or a Binomial distribution, as in Mullahy (1986) for example. The second 
component can be seen as a count data model (Poisson, Negative Binomial or Poisson log-normal). In 
light of the results in Jiménez-Martín et al (2000) we use a Probit specification for the first stage and a 
truncated type-2 Negative Binomial for the second stage. Details of the likelihood function and the 
testing procedures are in Jiménez-Martín et al (2000, 2002). 
  The TPM allows for some heterogeneity among individuals by distinguishing users from non-
users but does not allow heterogeneity among the users. The LCM deals with unobservable 
heterogeneity in a more general way. In these models the unobservable heterogeneity is approximated 
by a finite mixture distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). We restrict the number of classes to be the 
same across countries. In practice, setting this number equal to 2, prove enough to fit the data. We 
select the same density function for the visits to the physician than the one we chose for the second 
stage of the TPM, namely a type-2 Negative Binomial (see again Jiménez-Martín et al, 2002).  
4. TESTING PROCECURES AND RESULTS 
4.1 Testing among different models
As described above, we estimate by maximum likelihood a LCM (type II Negative Binomial) with two 
points of support for the visits to a GP and a TPM in which we specify a Probit for the first stage and a 
type II Negative Binomial for the second stage for the visits to a SP. The models are estimated 
separately for each country (heterogeneous models) and jointly for the pooled sample of countries 
(homogeneous models).  
We allow for different specifications of the homogenous models. First, we impose the same 
parameters for all countries apart from the constant. Second, we allow for differences across countries 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
3 Winkelmann (2001) allows for correlation between the errors but finds that this correlations is not significantly 
different from zero. 
4We assume absence of zeros in the second stage. Given the nature of the data that we have, a Zero Inflated Model 
(see Cameron and Trivedi, 1986, 1998 or Mullahy, 1986) accounting for zeros in the second stage is not 
reasonable since we know that a patient decides to contact a physician just when she makes a visit. Therefore, the 
count for those that decide to visit a physician in the first stage is always at least one. 
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in the constant and in the age and/or income coefficients. Third, we use a set of aggregated variables 
that vary across countries to control for the differences among them. Finally, we divide the countries in 
two groups: the ones in which the GP acts as gatekeeper of the medical system and the ones in which 
the GP does not act as gatekeeper. The models are estimated for the two groups of countries, allowing 
for differences in the constant term, and in the constant term and the age and income coefficients. The 
estimation is carried out separately for males and females since differences in behaviour regarding the 
demand for health can be expected according to sex, probably related to fertility in the case of the SP
equations. Before commenting the results of these models, we first discuss their performance. Table 2 
presents the likelihood and likelihood ratio (LR) tests of the restrictions implied by each specification. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
Two main results arise from this table. First, the heterogeneous model turns out to be the 
preferred specification. Second, three variables (age, income and the role of the GP) account for an 
important fraction of the differences in behaviour across countries. With respect to the first result, a test 
of the homogeneous model with different constant terms against the heterogeneous model rejects with a 
huge LR test the constraints imposed by the homogeneous specification (first row in Table 2, Panel B), 
for both males and females, and for both visits to GPs and to SPs. With respect to the second result, it 
can be seen (eighth row in Table 2, Panel B) that allowing for differences in the parameters of the age 
and income variables reduces the LR test between 27.9% (in the case of the SP equation for females) 
and 43.1% (in the case of the GP equation for females). If we additionally separate the countries among 
those in which a GP is the gatekeeper of the system and those in which s/he is not, the value of the 
initial LR test (ninth row in Table 2, Panel B) reduces 45.5% for the GP equation for males, 48.5% for 
the GP equation for females, 32.2% for the SP equation for males, and 36.4% for the SP equation for 
females. Therefore, around one third and half of the differences in behaviour across countries can be 
explained by the differences in income, age, and GP role. 
  From the results in Table 2 it can also be seen that the age variable is the one that has more 
differentiated effects across counties. When we test a model with only age interactions against a model 
with age and income interactions (fifth row in Table 2, Panel B) we cannot reject the first one in 
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general. It can also be seen that the specification with aggregated country variables performs worse than 
the specification with different intercepts for the countries. 
  Given the previous discussion, it seems interesting therefore to analyse first the results from a 
homogenous model, and see how these results change when we introduce more heterogeneity across 
countries until we reach the complete heterogeneous specification. That would give us a clear idea 
about the sources of variability in the demand for health across the European countries considered in 
this paper. 
4.2. Pooled estimates 
This section presents the results from the estimation of the models when we pool data for all countries 
in the sample. In the section 4.2.1 we discuss the estimation with country dummies and in the section 
4.2.2 the estimation with aggregate country dummies. Finally, in section 4.2.3 we discuss the 
homogeneous model when we allow for differences across countries in some of the slopes and when we 
divide the sample among countries in which a GP acts as a gatekeeper of the primary health care system 
and countries in which the GP does not have this role.  
4.2.1. Country dummies 
In this section we discuss the results for the homogeneous specification in which the country differences 
are given by differences in the constant term. We first discuss the effect of the explanatory variables on 
the number of visits to the GP and on the number of visits to the SP and afterwards comment these 
effects in relation to the existing literature. The results, presented in Table 3, are not surprisingly an 
average of the individual country results.  
We start analysing the effect of the variables that affect the individual’s health perception: age, 
income, health endowments and measures of the time opportunity cost. The effect of age is convex for 
males and significant for the GP visits and for the decision to contact the SP. For females the effect of 
age is also convex on the number of visits to the GP and to the SP, but concave in the probability of 
contacting the SP. Income has for males a convex effect on the number of visits to the GP and on the 
decision to contact a SP, while it has no effect on the number of visits to a SP. For females, the effect of 
income is similar on the number of visits to a GP, while we find a concave effect of income in the 
frequency and number of the visits to the SP.
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[insert Table 3 about here] 
The variables reflecting the individual’s stock of health are one of the most important 
determinants of the demand for GP services for both males and females. As expected self-perceived 
good health reduces the number of visits to the GP while suffering a chronic illness or being in-patient 
at a hospital during previous year increases the number of visits to the GP. As a measure of incapacity, 
the dummy that reflects whether the individual is hampered in her daily activities has a positive effect 
on the demand for GP services. Among all these variables relating the individual’s health endowment, 
the most important turns out to be the dummy for a chronic illness. These effects are also present in the 
decision to contact and the number of visits to a SP.
With respect to the effect of the variables that approximate the time opportunity cost, first the 
size of the household has a negative effect on the number of visits to a  GP or SP. It has a negative 
effect also on the frequency of the visits to the SP. For males household size effect is not well defined, 
in the sense that the estimated parameters have a higher standard deviation. Second, single females are 
in general less likely to visit a GP or a SP, and when visiting a SP they do it with less frequency. Again 
this effect is less important (in terms of significance) for males. Finally, the job status variables have the 
expected sign: either employed and self-employed individuals are less likely to visit a physician while 
non-working individuals (unemployed, retired or inactive) are more likely to visit a physician. This 
effect is better defined in the equation for contacting a SP.
Next we turn to the analysis of the effect of the variables that affect the probability of having a 
health shock and the knowledge of this likelihood. First, education shows a negative sign on the 
equation for the number of visits to a GP for both males and females. The education variable has a 
positive effect on the probability of contacting a SP and it increases the frequency of the visits to the SP
for females. Likewise, non-manual workers (professionals, clerical workers or service workers) visit the 
GP less often although the effect of a non-manual occupation for males is in general not significant. 
Concerning the visits to a SP in general non-manual workers are more likely to contact a SP although 
the effect of this occupation on the length of the treatment is not significant in general. A supervisory 
job, decreases the visits to a GP and increases the probability of contacting a SP, with this effect being 
better defined for males. Working in the public sector increases both the visits to a GP and the 
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probability of contacting a SP. Finally, to have a job self-perceived as risky in most of the cases 
increases the probability of visiting a GP.
To better understand the demand for health decision process  it is worth interpreting and 
commenting on the previous results, especially in the case of some variables, namely, age, income, the 
family variables, and education. First, a convex effect of age on the demand for health has been found 
previously in the literature by Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) or Cameron et al. (1988) using German and 
Australian data respectively. We obtain the same convex effect in both the GP and SP specifications.
Second, the income variable is of special importance. On the one hand this variable can be 
correlated with medical knowledge (education, for example). Individuals with higher income will be 
more informed consumers of medical care services and will favour SP services over GP services. In this 
case we will expect a negative effect of income on the number of visits to the GP and a positive effect 
on the probability of contacting a SP. On the other hand it can also reflect the willingness to pay for 
health services privately. In this case we expect a positive (probably at a decreasing rate) effect on the 
probability of contacting a physician, especially SP, that could be accessed via private consultation and 
payment. We find a convex or negative effect of income on the number of visits to the GP and a 
concave effect on the decision to contact a SP, which is coherent with a mixture of the two theories 
stated above. Santos Silva and Windmeijer (1997) found a similar concave effect for the UK. On the 
other hand, Propper (2000) found the same relationship in demanding any kind of private health 
services using UK data and probit models with random effects. Moreover the positive effect that we 
find for the frequency of the visits to the SP for females could be explained as a form of induced 
demand: the higher the willingness to pay on the part of the patient the longer the treatment. 
Third, with respect to other family related variables (marital status and size of the household) 
these have a bigger effect for females, especially for visits to the SP. This effect is coherent with 
fertility decisions (not explicitly introduced in this study) that affect the female demand for health care. 
The negative effect of the household size on the frequency of the visits to a GP or to a SP is coherent 
with a model in which there are economies of scale in the household production of health: in bigger 
households, fewer health inputs (here, visits to a physician) are required to obtain the same level of 
health than in smaller households. 
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Fourth, education as mentioned above can be correlated with medical knowledge, so that a 
higher educated person tends to favour SPs over GPs. On the other hand, people with higher education 
can improve their health more efficiently and therefore contact a GP or a SP less often (see Pohlmeier 
and Ulrich (1995) and Wagstaff (1986) for a discussion on the effect of education). We find a negative 
effect of education on the number of visits to the GP. The effect of education on the visits to a SP is less 
clear. For males, we find a positive effect of education on  the probability of contacting a SP and no 
effect on the frequency of the visits. For females the positive effect of education holds in both stages. 
Therefore there is a substitution going on between GPs and specialists and there is no evidence that 
highly educated individuals are more efficient in the production of health. Propper (2000) finds a 
positive effect of higher education on the probability of visiting any type of physician (public or 
private) with a multinomial logit model; we find the same effect in the first stage decision of visiting 
SPs for the UK. Occupational dummies reinforce the effect of education: the more skilled the individual 
is the higher the probability that he contacts a SP.
4.2.2. Aggregate dummies 
In this section we discuss the results for the homogeneous specification in which the country differences 
are summed up by a group of country aggregate dummies. These results are also presented in Table 3 
and they are similar to the ones discussed in previous section.  
The discussion of the variables referring to the different health systems deserves special 
attention. First, we find that the number of visits to the GP is smaller in countries in which the 
practitioners are paid through a fee-for-service. However in countries with fee-for-service payments 
individuals are more likely to contact the SP and visit it more frequently. Second, the number of 
physicians increases the number of visits to the GP but decreases the probability of contacting and 
visiting a SP for both males and females. Third, the total expenditure and its government participation 
have no clear effect on the number of visits to the GP, although they increase the probability of 
contacting and the number of visits to the SP. Finally, in countries were the GP act as gatekeeper of the 
system the frequency of the visits to the GP increases while the contact probability to the SP and the 
frequency of the visits decrease. Therefore it seems that GPs perform efficiently as gatekeepers.  
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The first of these results is of special interest. The fact that the frequency of the visits to the SP
(or the duration of the treatment under the maintained assumptions of the model) is bigger in countries 
with a fee-for-service payment scheme for doctors is coherent with the theoretical model of induced 
demand proposed: doctors that are paid fee-for-service tend to lengthen the duration of the treatments. 
4.2.3 Heterogeneity in the age and income variables and in the role of GPs 
In this section we discuss the results when we allow the differences among countries affect not only the 
intercept but also the parameters that relate age and income. The results
6 for all the variables are similar 
in sign and size to the previous sections therefore we concentrate here on the differential effect of age 
and income on the average visits to a physician. These effects are presented in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 
represents the average visits to a physician by age for a reference male and female
7. Figure 3 represents 
the average visits to a physician by level of income for males and females. The countries are grouped by 
the criterion of using GPs as gatekeepers.  
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
In Figure 2 it can be seen that the differences among countries in which the GP’s do not act as 
gatekeepers are more substantial than in countries in which the GPs do act as gatekeepers of the health 
care system, both in the visits to GPs and SPs and for both males and females. Figure 2 reveals that 
there are several similarities across countries. In general, the effect of age on the average visits to the 
GP is concave for both males and females, although the age in which the minimum is reached differs. 
Exceptions to this rule are Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Italy (only for females). In all these cases the 
effect of age is continuously increasing except for Ireland that shows a negative effect of age on the 
visits to the GP for females. With respect to the visits to the SP, there are more differences across 
countries. However, we see that on average older individuals visit on average the SP less than younger 
individuals (the effect can be continuously decreasing, decreasing at an increasing rate or decreasing at 
                                                          
6 They are available from the authors on request. 
7 The reference male and female are chosen to represent an average individual in the sample: married, head of a 
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distribution that follow the visits to the SP. The average visits to a GP have the following form 
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a decreasing rate). The only exceptions are for Austrian and Luxembourg women, and for German and 
Luxembourg men. Women tend to visit the SP more often than men and the effect of age is stronger for 
them. 
Figure 3 shows the average visits to a doctor by income levels. It can be seen that as stated in  
Section 4.1, the differences in the effect of this variable across countries  are less substantial than the 
differences on the effect of age. In general, there is no effect or an increasing effect of income on the 
number of visits to the GP for both males and females except for Portugal for males and for Portugal, 
Spain and Ireland for females. With respect to the visits to the SP, either there is no effect or the effect 
is negative. The exceptions are the Netherlands and Denmark for males, and Greece, Ireland and Spain 
for females that show a positive effect.  
In both figures it is worth noticing the different results for Greece, with a significantly lower 
average number of visits to GPs and a significantly higher number of visits to SPs than the rest of 
countries (specially for females).
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this work we analyse both the decision to visit a GP and a specialist for a sample of EU countries 
using data from the ECHP. The major novelty of this paper is that it uses a homogeneous and 
comparable data set to estimate a common model of demand for physician services for a group of 
European countries. It contributes to the literature on demand for health in several directions. First it 
sheds some light about the empirical determinants of demand for health across EU countries. Second, it 
allows us to explore the ability of pooled models in order to account for differences across countries. In 
particular, it permits to evaluate the explanatory power of those variables characterizing the differences 
across specific health systems.  






j j i i p X y E
1
) | ( λ , where λj is the expected number of visits (following a Negative Binomial distribution) of 
the class j of individuals and pj is the associated probability of belonging to class j.
8 The results from the estimation are available from the authors on request. See also Jiménez-Martín et al (2002) 
for further discussion. 
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We find behavioural differences across countries. Several tests show that a heterogeneous 
model, which is estimated separately by country, is the preferred specification against a set of 
homogeneous models,  with different degrees of heterogeneity among countries. However, between a 
third and a half of the variability of the demand for health across EU countries can be explained by 
differences in the effect of age, income and the role of GP’s on the health care system.  
The results obtained from heterogeneous models show important differences but also several 
general patterns of behaviour in the demand for health across the European Union. First, we find a 
convex effect of age on the demand for health for most countries, specially when measuring the demand 
for health as the number of visits to a GP. Second, we do not find any effect of income on the number 
of visits to the GP, although income affects the decision to contact a SP in a concave way. The positive 
effect of income on the frequency of visits to the SP for females could be explained as a form of 
induced demand. Third, household size affects negatively the demand for health thus indicating 
economies of scale. Fourth, education and some occupation variables show a mixed effect of income 
(positive) and efficiency (negative) in the production of health.
Despite the fact that the pooled models do fit worse the data than a completely heterogeneous 
model, they still allow us to extract some interesting lessons: we found that the variables that capture 
the differences among the respective health systems show the correct sign and are significant in a vast 
majority of cases. For example, we confirm that in those countries in which the practitioners are paid 
through a fee-for-service system the number of visits to GP is smaller than in the rest while the reverse 
occurs with visits to the SP. This is coherent with the theoretical model of induced demand proposed. 
Finally, we find multiple evidence that GP are efficient gatekeepers in those countries where this 
system is used. 
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Public participation in 
Total Health 
Expenditure (b)
      1995  1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 
Germany  F  NO 3.4 3.4  10.2 10.6 78.1 78.3 
Denmark  F  YES  2.9  2.9 8.2 8.3  82.6  82.4 
Netherl  C  YES  2.6  2.6 8.9 8.8  72.5  67.7 
Belgium  F  NO 3.4 3.4  8.2  8.6 88.7 88.8 
Luxemb  F  NO 2.8 2.9  6.3  6.4 92.4 92.8 
UK  C  YES  1.6  1.6 7.0 7.0  84.9  83.7 
Ireland  C  YES  2.1  2.1 7.4 7.2  72.7  72.5 
Italy  C  YES  5.4  5.5 8.0 8.1  67.7  67.8 
Greece S NO  3.9  4 8.3  8.3  58.7  58.7 
Spain  S  YES  4.1  4.2 7.0 7.1  78.3  78.5 
Portugal S  YES  3  3  7.7 7.7  65.3  66.7 
Austria  F  NO 2.7 2.8  8.9  8.9 71.9 70.5 
Notes.
(a)  Source: WHO (1997) 
(b)  Source: Health Data OECD (2000) 
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Table 2. Model selection and specification testing  
PANEL A 
  GP (LCM)  SP (TPM) 
  Males Females Males Females 
(1) All countries  144511,4 181669,3 85985,3 124831,4 
(2) + Age interact.  144008,9 180845,3 85843,7 124666,9 
(3) + Inc. Interact.  144468,0 181621,4 85899,7 124693,5 
(4) + All interact.  143960,7 180784,7 85759,1 124537,8 
(5) With agg. Vars  145054,6 182166,1 86402,0 126549,2 
Gate Keeper (GK)  99703,7 128633,0 54550,0 79001,0 
Not GK  44452,6 52918,0 31341,1 45726.8 
(6) GK+Not GK  144156,3 181551 85891,1 124727,8 
GK+ all inter.  99485,5 128169,1 54457,9 78844,5 
Not GK +all inter.  44253,3 52503,5 31245,5 45604,0 
(7) (GK+Not GK)+all inter.  143738,8 180672,6 85703,4 124448.5 











































































(*) In parenthesis the dof for the LR test statistic
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Figure 2. Average visits to the physician by age 
AGE EFECT: MALES









































































































































































































































x   G e r m a n y        Denmark 
+   B e l g i u m       +     N e t h e r l a n d s  
o  Luxembourg     ◊ UK 
  Greece      .    Ireland 
.   A u s t r i a       O   I t a l y
x Spain 
∆   Portugal 
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Figure 3. Average visits to the physician by income 
INCOME EFECT: MALES









































































































































































































































x  Germany         Denmark 
+   B e l g i u m       +     N e t h e r l a n d s  
o  Luxembourg     ◊   UK 
  Greece      .    Ireland 
.   A u s t r i a       O   I t a l y
x   Spain 
∆   Portugal 
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DATA APPENDIX 
The variables included in the analysis are grouped in the following three categories: 
1)  Variables that affect the individual’s health perception 
• Age and its square 
• Household income and its squared (in 10^5 PPP units), dated in wave –1 
• Variables measuring the individual’s health endowments as 
− a dummy if the individual reports himself as having good health, dated in wave -1. 
− a dummy for individuals having a chronic physical or mental health problem, current (since it was 
not asked for in the first wave of the survey). 
− a dummy if the individual is hampered in daily activities by any physical or mental health 
problem, illness or disability, dated in wave -1. 
− a dummy if individual was admitted as in-patient in a hospital during the previous year, dated in 
wave –1 
• Variables measuring the time opportunity cost of the individual 
− relating to job status 
× dummies for self-employment, unemployment, and retirement, dated in wave -1. 
× dummy for part-time employment, dated in wave –1. 
− relating to the family structure 
× marital status: two dummies, one taking value 1 if the individual is married, and the other 
equalling 1 if the individual is separated/divorced/widowed  
× a dummy for the individual being head of the household, dated in wave -1. 
× household size 
2)  Variables that affect the probability of having a health shock and the knowledge of this likelihood 
• education: a dummy for the individual having a third level of education recognised. 
• occupational dummies for professionals, clerical workers, and services workers, dated in wave –1 
• dummy for doing any type of supervisory job, dated in wave –1. 
• dummy for working in the public sector, dated in wave –1. 
• dummy that equals one if the individual perceives his job as risky, dated in wave –1. 
3)  Country specific variables:  see Table 1. 
In Table A1 we present summary statistics by sex and by sex and country. 
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3. Los originales recibidos serán sometidos a un breve proceso de evaluación en el
que serán directamente aceptados para su publicación, aceptados sujetos a
revisión o rechazados. Se valorará, asimismo, la presentación de¡ trabajo en
seminarios de centrA.
4. En la primera página deberá aparecer el título del trabajo, nombre y filiación del
autor(es), dirección postal y electrónica de referencia y agradecimientos. En esta
misma página se incluirá también un resumen en castellano e inglés de no más de
100 palabras, los códigos JEL y las palabras clave de trabajo.
5. Las notas al texto deberán numerarse correlativamente al pie de página. Las
ecuaciones se numerarán, cuando el autor lo considere necesario, con números
arábigos entre corchetes a la derecha de las mismas.
6. La Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces facilitará la difusión electrónica de los
documentos de trabajo. Del mismo modo, se incentivará económicamente su
posterior publicación en revistas científicas de reconocido prestigio.